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THE RICO LOTTERY AND THE GAINS MULTIPLICATION
APPROACH: AN ALTERNATIVE MEASUREMENT
OF DAMAGES UNDER CIVIL RICO
JONATHAN TURLEY*

INTRODUCTION

N the Eastern District of New York, Hasidic rabbis file charges
of racketeering against their counterparts in a rival Hasidic sect
for an alleged attempted takeover of a synagogue.I In the Southern District of New York, a 92 year-old woman charges her 75
year-old son-in-law with racketeering in diverting her social security checks and other funds.2 In Massachusetts, an ex-church
member charges church elders with racketeering for alleged theft
of her garbage and with general harassment 3 while, back in New
York, a divorced woman files the same charge against her estranged husband for failure to comply with their divorce settlement. 4 The list is seemingly endless as racketeering charges of
* Federal Judicial Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. B.A., University of Chicago (1983); J.D., Northwestern University School
of Law (1987). The author would like to thank Kirsten Engel, Victor Goldberg,
and Richard Speidel for their encouragement in this project. The author, however, is solely responsible for the theories contained in this Article.
1. Congregation Beth Yitzhok v. Briskman, 566 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
2. Nathan, Civil RICO: A Primer on the Emerging Use and Abuse of an Elastic
Treble Damge Remedy, in 2 RICO: THE ULTIMATE WEAPON IN BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 38 (ABA, Division of Professional Educ., 1983) (citing

Green v. Bartholomew, No. 78 Civ. 3994 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)).
3. Id. at 31 (citing Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp.
1125, 1138 (D. Mass. 1982) ("The court dismissed the action, interpreting
RICO narrowly, in part to avoid risking the abridgement of First Amendment
religious interests."). The author has applied civil RICO and the gains multiplication approach to cases of religious fraud. Turley, Laying Hands on Religious
Racketeers: Applying Civil RICO to Fraudulent Religious Solicitation, 29 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 441 (1988).

4. Nathan, supra note 2, at 31 (citing Alton v. Alton, No. 82 Civ. 0795
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (RICO action dismissed "[while] in Gunther v. Dinger, 81 Civ.
No. 6985 (S.D.N.Y. filed 1982), the court sustained the complaint in which a
daughter and heir of the deceased, sued the widow and three other children of

(239)
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every possible stripe and color clog the dockets of state and federal courts. 5 The method to this madness can be found in title IX
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, entitled "Racketeer
6
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," better known as RICO.
RICO is the product of a massive legislative campaign for the
avowed purpose of "seek[ing] the eradication of organized crime
in the United States." 7 The 1950s witnessed widespread public
outcry following reports of an expanding underworld presence in
legitimate businesses." As a bipartisan effort, RICO was intended
to root out the influence of organized crime through the enforcement of both criminal and civil penalties. 9 In designing RICO,
Congress was cognizant of the fact "that it was entering a new
domain of federal involvement . . .[and that] existing law, state
and federal, was not adequate to address the problem."' 10 RICO's
sponsors committed themselves to developing new, and more potent, weapons to carry out its intent. With almost jesuitical fervor, the drafting committees wrote the operative provisions of
RICO broadly to eliminate any possible loopholes or shortfalls in
the language that might be exploited by mobsters."l Rather than
the deceased for alleged fraud in the administration of the estate and conversion
of assets")).
5. In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. Inc.,Justice White, writing for the majority, noted that "[o]f 270 district court RICO decisions prior to this year, only 3%
(nine cases) were decided throughout the 1970s, 2% were decided in 1980, 7%
in 1981, 13% in 1982, 31% in 1983, and 43% in 1984." 473 U.S. 479, 481 n.1
(1985). Between September 1985 and June 1986, there were a reported 614
civil RICO cases filed in federal court. 614 Civil RICO Suits Filed Between September, 1985 and June 30, 1986, 5 RICO L. REP. 246 (1987). This figure does not
include cases filed in the twenty states with "little RICO" statutes. See Cohen,
State RICO Statutes, 4 RICO L. REP. 660, 660-62 (1986).
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
7. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 92223 (1970) (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
8. Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v.
Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249 (1982); see also 1 ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAw, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO
TASK FORCE 75 n.70 (1985) [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
9. ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 86. Senator Hruska, one of civil RICO's
drafters, actually felt that of the Act's two parts-criminal and civil-the civil
penalties were the more important:
[T]he criminal provisions are intended primarily as an adjunct to the
civil provisions which I consider as the more important feature of the
[Act] .... The [Act] is innovative in the sense that it vitalizes procedures which have been tried and proved in the antitrust field and applies them into the organized crime field where they have been seldom
used before.
Id. (quoting Sen. Hruska).
10. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981).
11. Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1579 (E.D. Mich. 1983). The
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defining a class of "organized criminals,"' 2 Congress defined a
wide variety of illegal activity that constitutes a "pattern of racketeering."' 3 In addition to this highly generalized definition of
racketeering behavior, Congress expanded the scope of the Act
even further by exposing racketeers to civil suit as well as criminal
prosecution and thereby opening a "second front" against organized crime.
If the scope of RICO indicated the gravity of the racketeering
problem in Congress' eyes, the penalties of the statute demonstrated the clear intent of Congress to put matters right. On the
criminal side,' 4 Congress gave prosecutors stiff sentences' 5 and
Seventh Circuit dealt with this point, in Sutlff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., as follows:
"Congress deliberately cast the net of liability wide, being more concerned to
avoid opening loopholes through which minions of organized crime might crawl
to freedom than to avoid making garden-variety frauds actionable in federal
treble-damage proceedings-the price of eliminating all possible loopholes."
727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741
F.2d 482, 504 (2d Cir. 1984) (Cardamone, J., dissenting), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479
(1985).
12. RICO's drafters consciously avoided defining such terms as "organized
crime" or "organized criminal" for both practical and strategic reasons. Practically, such a definition was thought to be fraught with constitutional and even
racial difficulties:
The gentleman inquired rhetorically as to why no effort was made to
define organized crime in this [Act]. This is, in part, because it is probably impossible precisely and definitively to define organized crime.
But if it were possible, I ask my friend, would he not be the first to
object that in criminal law we establish procedures which would be applicable only to a certain type of defendant? Would he not be the first
to object to such a system?
116 CONG. REC. 35,204 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff); see also id. at 35,344
(statement of Rep. Poff) ("The curious objection has been raised to [the Act] as
a whole, and to several of its provisions in particular, that they are not somehow
limited to organized crime-as if organized crime were a precise and operative
legal concept, like murder, rape or robbery.").
13. Under the Act, a "pattern of racketeering" can amount to little more
than two predicate offenses (which include mail and wire fraud). 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) (1982). This generous definition incensed a number of congressmen,
including Representative Abnor Mikva: "[U]nder this definition, if five ... of
[my colleagues] engage in ...

a game of poker and it lasts past midnight... thus

continuing for a period of 2 days, then [they] have been running an organized
gambling business and [they] can get 20 years ......
116 CONG. REC. 35,204
(1970) (statement of Rep. Mikva).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). The criminal penalties under RICO stated in
part:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter
shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962, and
(2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual
right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise
which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
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the right to seize and sell property belonging to convicted racketeers.' 6 On the civil side,' 7 Congress applied the same private
enforcement mechanism that proved highly successful in the antitrust area.' 8 The remedies included treble damages' 9 and attorney's fees, 20 in addition to generous provisions concerning
(c) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall
authorize the Attorney General to seize all property or other interest
declared forfeited under this section upon such terms and conditions as
the court shall deem proper.
Id. § 1963.
15. Id. § 1963(a).
16. Id. § 1963(c).
17. Id. § 1962. Section 1962 provides in part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person
has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18,
United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of
such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any
of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id. § 1962 (footnote omitted).
18. The incorporation of antitrust remedies into RICO was done at the suggestion of the ABA's antitrust section which confirmed that racketeering had
severe anti-competitive effects, as well as other social costs. The substance of
the report by the antitrust section and its subsequent history is laid out extensively in the ABA REPORT:
The Section agreed "that organized crime must be stopped," and further agreed that "the time tested machinery of the antitrust laws contains several useful and workable features which are appropriate for use
against organized crime," including, in addition to criminal penalties,
civil enforcement by private party treble damage actions .... The ABA
Section stressed, however, that .. . [b]y placing the antitrust type en-

forcement and discovery procedures in a separate statute, a commingling of criminal enforcement goals with the goals of regulating
competition is avoided."
ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 81.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
20. Id.
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standing, 2 ' service 2 2 and the statute of limitations.2 3
In developing civil RICO's damages provisions, Congress relied heavily on the antitrust penalties contained in section four of
the Clayton Act, particularly the latter's treble damages provision. 24 Yet, for many congressmen 25 and commentators, 2 6 the
similarities between RICO and the Clayton Act were overshadowed by critical dissimilarities. Preeminent among these differences are the specified predicate acts 2 7 required to trigger RICO.
Included in the long list of predicate offenses are mail 28 and wire
fraud, 29 any two related instances of which will satisfy the Act's
definition of a "pattern of racketeering."13 0 Since each letter or
21. Id.
22. Id. § 1965(b).
23. Id. § 1961(5).
24. 113 CONG. REC. 17,999 (1967) (statement of Sen. Hruska) (RICO takes
readily from the antitrust laws); 115 CONG. REC. 6,995 (1969) (statement of
ABA, Antitrust Sec.) (same). Other provisions in RICO beside the penalty provisions, also follow the Clayton Act. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. MalleyDuff& Assocs., 107 S.Ct. 2759, 2763-65 (1987) (Clayton Act's four-year statute
of limitations applies in civil RICO cases).
25. RICO's sweeping language prompted three congressmen, Mikva (Illinois), Conyers (Michigan), and Ryan (New York), to dissent from the House
Judiciary Committee Report. ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 117. Fearing that
innocent businessmen would be harassed, the congressmen continued their opposition on the House floor. Id. Congressman Mikva went as far as to offer an
amendment that would provide treble damages for defendants sued maliciously
under RICO. Id. at 118.
26. See generally Dunne, RICO-Zeal Without Understanding, 101 BANKING L.J.
291 (1984); Fricano, Civil RICO: An Antitrust Plaintiff's Considerations, 52 ANITRUST L.J. 361 (1983); Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in
Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 55; Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A
Legislative Approach, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 423 (1983); Parnon, RICO Damages:
Look to the Clayton Act, Not the Predicate Act, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 348 (1985); Comment, RICO and Equitable Remedies Not Availablefor Private Litigants, 21 CAL. W.L.
REV. 385 (1985); Comment, Civil RICO Actions in Commercial Litigation: Racketeer or
Businessman?, 36 Sw. L.J. 925 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Civil RICO Actions in
Commercial Litigation]; Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial
Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Civil RICO: The
Temptation and Impropriety]; Note, Civil RICO and "Garden Variety" Fraud-A Suggested Analysis, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 93 (1983); Note, The Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt OrganizationsAct: An Analysis of the Confusion in its Application and a Proposal
for Reform, 33 VAND. L. REV. 441 (1980).

27. For the list of predicate acts under RICO, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)
(1982).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 1961(5). To prevail under civil RICO a civil litigant must prove
that (1) a person (which is defined to include businesses), (2) through the commission of two or more acts (3) which constitute a pattern (4) of racketeering
activity, (5) directly or indirectly has (i) invested in, (ii) maintained an interest in,
(iii) participated in the conduct of or (iv) conspired to do (i), (ii) or (iii) in (6) an
enterprise, (7) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce. Id.
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phone call conveying fraudulent information qualifies as a separate offense,3 1 the threshold for a provable pattern of racketeering was set quite low for RICO plaintiffs.3 2 Nevertheless,
congressional attempts to reduce the breadth and bite of RICO
floundered 33 before an effort to strike "a mortal blow against the
34
property interests of organized crime."
The inevitable effect of including mail and wire fraud as
predicate acts under RICO was the snaring of large numbers of
defendants far removed from the back rooms of La Cosa Nostra.3 5 Courts watched in dismay as RICO brought the full weight
of its mob-fighting remedies to bear upon businessmen in "garden-variety fraud cases." 3 6 As a result, judges balked and re§ 1962; see also Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
31. The pattern requirement has been a point of disagreement among the
circuits and now appears to be set for a Supreme Court review. See infra note 44
and accompanying text.
32. See Comment, Civil RICO: Pleading Fraudfor Treble Damages, 45 Morr. L.
REV. 87, 95 (1984).

33. The latest, unsuccessful attempt at amending civil RICO was H.R.
5445, which would have eliminated the availability of treble damages in most
cases. For a discussion of the proposed amendment, see infra note 45.
34. See ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 86 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 602

(1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska)).
35. Id. at 117. A 1982 ABA study found that forty-three percent of civil
RICO suits in federal court allege security fraud violations while thirty-seven
percent involve other forms of commercial fraud. Id. at 55-56. The ABA noted
that only "nine percent of the cases involve allegations of criminal activity of a
type generally associated with professional criminals (arson, bribery, embezzlement, commercial bribery, extortion, gambling, theft, political corruption)." Id.
at 56 (footnote omitted); cf Oversight on Civil RICO Suits, Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Stephen S. Trott, Ass't Att'y Gen) (noting that two-thirds of civil
RICO suits involve mail, wire or securities fraud while "[r]oughly seven percent
appear to have been brought against organized crime figures or on the basis of
violent or other non-fraudulent conduct common to organized crime"). Among
the organizations found to be "racketeering enterprises" under the Act were the
Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes in the State of Pennsylvania, United
States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1092 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1072 (1978); the office of the county judge of Craighead County, Arkansas,
United States v. Clark, 646 F.2d 1259, 1264 (8th Cir. 1981); and the police department of the city of Macon, Georgia, United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407,
416 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
36. The use of RICO in "garden variety fraud" cases was recently upheld in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). For a strong presentation
of the opposite view, see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.
1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985); see also Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 529
(2d Cir. 1984) ("If the conduct of such people can sometimes fairly be characterized as 'garden variety fraud', we can only conclude that by the RICO statute
congress has provided an additional means to weed that 'garden' of its fraud."),
vacated and remanded, 473 U.S. 922 (1985) (remanded for consideration in light of
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sisted.3 7 To these judges, civil RICO's treble damages remedy
and procedural advantages in cases of simple fraud appeared not
only excessive, but a virtual federalization of common-law
38
fraud.
In response to what they perceived to be unwarranted and
unfair advantages for plaintiffs, judges developed a number of
strict interpretive restraints upon civil RICO's use.3 9 These included a requirement that plaintiffs establish an affiliation of defendants with organized crime; 40 a racketeering injury beyond
that of the predicate offense, 4 or a "competitive injury;" 4 2 raising
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) and American Nat'l Bank v.
Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
37. For a discussion of restraints imposed by district courts on civil litigants
under RICO, see Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety, supra note 26,
at 1105-15.
38. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 507 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[N]othing in the language of the statute or the legislative
history suggests that Congress intended either the federalization of state common law or the displacement of existing federal remedies."). But see 116 CONG.
REc. 35,217 (1970) (statement of Rep. Eckhardt) (RICO "mov[es] large substantive areas formerly totally within the police power of the state into the Federal
realm"); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981) (stating that
"Congress was well aware" of RICO's potential for federalizing common law);
Blakey, supra note 8, at 264. See generally Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d
511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 473 U.S. 922 (1985) (remanded for
consideration in light of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) and
American Nat'l Bank v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985)); Teltronics Servs.,
Inc. v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd sub nom.,
In re Teltronics Servs., Inc., 762 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1985).
39. Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety, supra note 26, at 110515.
40. See generally Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'don other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984);
Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); ABA REPORT,
supra note 8, at 170-78.
41. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 494 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd,
473 U.S. 479 (1985); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir.
1984), vacated and remanded, 473 U.S. 922 (1985) (remanded for consideration in
light of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) and American Nat'l
Bank v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985)); White v. Fosco, 599 F. Supp. 710,
716 (D.D.C. 1984); see also Comment, Civil RICO: The Resolution of the Racketeering
EnterpriseInjury Requirement, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 364, 369 n.28 (1985); Note, Civil
RICO and Parens Patriae: Lowering Litigation Barriers Through State Intervention, 24
WM. & MARY L. REV. 429 (1983).
42. The competitive injury requirement was rejected by the Supreme Court
in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc. 473 U.S. 479, 493-95 (1985). See Schacht
v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1356-58 (7th Cir.) (also rejecting competitive injury
requirement), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); see generally Comment, Reading
the "Enterprise" Element Back Into RICO: Sections 1962 and 1964(c), 76 Nw. U.L.
REV. 100, 125-26 (1981); Comment, Civil RICO Actions in Commercial Litigation,
supra note 26, at 949; Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety, supra note
26, at 1109-14.
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the burden of proof;4 3 strictly interpreting the pattern requirement 44 and limiting the use of treble damages 45 to parties with
clear racketeering ties rather than "legitimate" business persons. 46 Moreover, many judges,4 7 spurred by a host of commen43. Under civil RICO, plaintiffs need only prove their case "by a preponderance of the evidence." See, e.g., United States v. Local 560 of the Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 279-80 n.12 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140
(1986); Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 133-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983). This has
irked a number of commentators who argue that the severe stigma of being labelled a "racketeer" warrants a higher standard of proof. See, e.g., Note, Enforcing Criminal Laws Through Civil Proceedings: Section 1964 of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1970), 53 TEX. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (1975)
[hereinafter Note, Enforcing CriminalLaws], see generally Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basisfor Compromise, 71 MINN. L. REV. 827, 869-71 (1987); Note, Government Corruption and Civil RICO: Providing Compensation for Intangible Losses, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1530, 1544 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Government Corruption].
44. The Supreme Court recently granted the writ of certiorari in a case
which will clarify the pattern requirement. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988). The
Eighth Circuit follows a strict interpretation of "continuity plus relationship,"
the phrase used by the Supreme Court in Sedima to describe the pattern requirement. See, e.g. Holmberg v. Morrisette, 800 F.2d 205, 209-10 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1953 (1987). Under the Eighth Circuit test, a civil RICO
plaintiff must show that the predicate acts were committed as part of more than
one fraudulent scheme or criminal episode. Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785
F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986). This strict interpretation has rightly been rejected by the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. See, e.g. Sun Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 192 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 192-93 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229
(1987); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d
966, 971 (11 th Cir. 1986); Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312,
313 (7th Cir. 1985). It is ironic that, after expressly instructing courts not to
judicially amend RICO through narrow interpretations, the Court's mere mention of "continuity plus relationship" should become the new method ofjudicial
"RICO reform." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
Like Sedima, H.J., Inc. appears to have more to do with judicial sentiments than
legislative intent regarding the scope of civil RICO.
45. In 1987, a bill was offered by the HouseJudiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Justice which would have drastically limited the use of treble
damages in civil RICO cases. The bill, H.R. 5445, originally included an outright elimination of treble damages in civil cases but was later modified to limit
treble damages for governmental suits and for private suits when brought
against defendants already convicted criminally. While the bill passed the
House, it was tabled in the Senate. For an excellent discussion of the bill and its
provisions, see Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 855-83; see also notes 175-82 and
accompanying text.
46. A number of critics of civil RICO single out the Act's harsh label as
unfair to "legitimate businessmen" sued under the Act. See, e.g., Hearings, supra
note 35, at 248 (statement of Ray J. Groves, Chairman, Am. Inst. of Certified
Public Accountants); Horn, The Venue of the Debate Shifts From the Courts to the Congress, Nat'l LJ., Aug. 26, 1985, at 24, col. 3; Comment, Congress Responds to
Sedima: Is There a Contract Out on Civil RICO?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 851, 869-70
(1986); Comment, Liability for General Business Fraud. Putting a Contract Out on
RICO Treble Damages, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 481,493-94 (1984). The stigmatization
is thought so severe that a higher standard of proof has been advocated for civil
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tators, 48 advocated a closer reliance on civil RICO's statutory

49
model, the Clayton Act.

While most of these suggested requirements were rejected by
the United States Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. ,50

it is still possible that Congress could incorporate them into
RICO. Indeed, legal academics have put forward a number of
possible amendments to RICO's damages section. 5' This paper
is concerned with one of these proposed restrictions which I will
call the Clayton Act approach. Under this approach, courts would
follow the remedies provision of the Clayton Act when awarding
treble damages. Rather than simply trebling the damages caused
by the predicate acts in a particular case (as RICO does presently), the Clayton Act approach would treble only three types of
proven damages: increased business costs, lost profits, and re52
duction in the value of the plaintiff's business.
RICO cases. See supra note 45. In 1982, the criminal justice section of the American Bar Association endorsed the proposed use of "criminal" in lieu of "racketeering" in the Act, stating that "th[e] stigma of labelling one a racketeer is
particularly unfair since RICO is not applied solely to racketeers or offenses
committed by racketeers but has also been applied to businessmen and politicians engaged in criminal conduct unrelated to traditional notions of organized
crime." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES,
SECTION ON CRIMINALJUSTICE 4 (1982); see also Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 85960. The Supreme Court, however, has dismissed this "labelling argument" as
overly generous to defendants who are, at best, guilty of a pattern of fraudulent
behavior:
[A] civil RICO proceeding leaves no greater stain than do a number of
other civil proceedings. Furthermore, requiring conviction of the predicate acts would not protect against an unfair imposition of the "racketeer" label. If there is a problem with thus stigmatizing a garden-variety
defrauder by means of a civil action, it is not reduced by making certain
that the defendant is guilty of fraud beyond a reasonable doubt.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 492 (1985) (emphasis in original);
see also 116 CONG. REC. 35,344 (1970) (statement of Rep. Pofi) ("organized
crime" is "a shorthand method of referring to a large and varying group of individual criminal offenses committed in diverse circumstances."); Hearings, supra
note 35, at 13 (statement by Philip A. Feigin, chairman, Special Projects Comm.,
Enforcement Section, North Am. Sec. Admin. Ass'n, Inc.) (rejecting "sanitized
phrases [such as 'garden variety fraud' and 'technical violations'] often used by
'legitimate businesses and individuals' to distinguish their frauds from the 'real'
frauds perpetrated by the 'real' crooks.").
47. For a listing of courts suggesting the adoption of many of the characteristics of the Clayton Act either implicitly or explicitly, see Comment, supra note
41, at 367-68 n.24.
48. See, e.g., Parnon, supra note 26; ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 276-78.
49. For a history of how the Clayton Act model was introduced into the
statute, see ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 79-97.
50. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
51. ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 239-80; see also Goldsmith, supra note 43;
Parnon, supra note 26.
52. Parnon, supra note 26, at 349 n.11.
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In this Article, I will argue that the Clayton Act approach is
fundamentally inconsistent with the purposes and structure of
civil RICO. As an alternative to this approach, I will suggest a
new method for calculating damages that would differentiate between those businesses that are substantially and those that are
fractionally reliant on racketeering profits. This method of calculation, which I will call gains multiplication, would use the actual
gains received through racketeering to determine the baseline
damages subject to trebling. Under the gains multiplication approach, those businesses substantially reliant upon gains received
from racketeering would be eliminated from the marketplace, as
intended under RICO. Yet, those businesses only fractionally reliant would be expected to remain solvent, though deterred from
future racketeering. Although perhaps artless, the simple trebling of racketeering gains will be suggested as an effective and
easy method of determining racketeering reliance. More importantly, however, the gains multiplication approach is meant to focus attention on RICO's underlying philosophy of damages as a
basis for any future modifications of the Act. Without an appreciation of the economic and normative foundations of RICO's damages provisions, new approaches taken from the antitrust area will
likely exacerbate, rather than eliminate, any current problems in
the Act.
I will begin my discussion by considering the basic approaches used under RICO and the Clayton Act to measure damages and to deter violations. It will be shown how RICO was
designed to "penalty maximize," or drive up damages as high as
possible so as to force racketeering businesses into insolvency. It
will then be shown how the Clayton Act strives for cost minimization by setting damages to match the cost of a violation to society.
In this way, the Clayton Act operates to "price" violations and
ultimately encourages "efficient violations," or violations that are
of greater net benefit to the violator than detriment to society. A
pricing system, it will be argued, is anathema to RICO's penalty
maximization scheme which strives to proscribe all racketeering
without distinction through a system of sanctions.
The Clayton Act's pricing and RICO's sanctioning systems
will then be examined in terms of their underlying methods for
calculating damages. A pricing system, it will be shown, requires
a harm-oriented measurement of damages that establishes the
harm produced by the violation. This is essential if a proper
"pricing," and thereby an efficient violation, can be deduced. A
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system of sanctions, conversely, is optimally tied to a gain-oriented measurement of damages so as to deny any profit-making
that would lead to efficient violations.
A gain-oriented structure will be offered as more in keeping
with RICO's original purpose and penalty-maximizing scheme.
The difficulty in calculating social costs, problems of information
deficiency, "perverse incentives," and the community's perception of racketeering as malum in se will be presented as contributing reasons for rejecting cost minimization as an acceptable
alternative for measuring damages. The discussion will then turn
to the alternative method for calculating racketeering damages
suggested in this Article, the gains multiplication approach. This
approach, it will be argued, retains RICO's intended sanctioning
system but refines its use of penalty maximization to differentiate
between types of racketeers. Finally, it will be shown how, by
trebling racketeering gains, RICO can provide society with an
easy litmus test for determining the reliance of individual firms on
racketeering proceeds. With this test, society can remove from
the market those firms that are substantially reliant on racketeering while reforming firms with only a fractional reliance.
PART I

RICO

AND THE CLAYTON ACT:

RIVALING NOTIONS OF

OPTIMAL DETERRENCE AND DAMAGES

Any discussion of the possible incorporation of Clayton Act
remedies into RICO must necessarily consider the particular purposes behind the remedy provisions of both acts. 5 3 These purposes are in fact difficult to reconcile either in terms of the level
of deterrence or the level of damages envisioned by their drafters.
The purposes of antitrust regulation under the Clayton Act are,
primarily, to compensate victims, maintain a competitive market
and to reform businesses involved in inefficient and anti-competitive behavior. 5 4 The purpose of RICO, in contrast, is the deter53. Gorelick, The Measure of Damages of RICO Actions in RICO: THE SECOND
STAGE (ABA ed. Oct. 1984) ("There are no reported cases discussing the mea-

sure of damages in RICO actions."); Parnon, supra note 26, at 348 ("[A]lmost no
attention has been paid to civil RICO damages by the courts, Congress, or
commentators.").
54. Since the Clayton Act strives to restore a competitive environment to
the market, courts will usually deny treble damages in antitrust cases which
would threaten a company with economic ruin. Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp.
1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1983). "RICO," the Ralston court urged, "has the opposite purpose. It is precisely designed to ruin those individuals and enterprises it
is aimed at. It is not designed to increase their efficiency or protect them from
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rence of possible racketeers by ruining businesses found guilty of
racketeering. 55 Accordingly, the Clayton Act approach strives for
cost minimization in dispensing damages while the RICO's predicate act approach strives for penalty maximization. The following
discussion will examine the development and significance of both
the penalty maximization and cost minimization approaches to
measuring damages under the two acts.
A.
1.

RICO: Penalty Maximization

Deterrence through Penalty Maximization

The primary purpose of civil RICO is prosecutorial, not compensatory. 56 While the victims of racketeering were carefully considered by Congress, 5 7 the use of treble damages and the special
insolvency." Id. (emphasis in original). In Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman &Seidman,Judge
Posner concluded that "analogies [of civil RICO) to section 4 of the Clayton Act
are forced." 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); see also
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir.) (rejecting analogies between
RICO and antitrust laws), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685
F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that different policies underlie RICO
and antitrust laws), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
Significantly, further analogies to the Clayton Act came up a number of
times during the debates and were consistently rejected. Senator Hruska, one of
the sponsors of the legislation disavowed antitrust standing parallels entirely.
Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1358 n.18 (quoting 115 CONG. REc. 6,992 (1969)). Another
RICO sponsor, Senator McClellan stated that, "[t]here is .. .no intention here
of importing the great complexity of antitrust law enforcement into this field."
Id. (quoting 115 CONG. REC. 9,567 (1969)). Perhaps more importantly, Congress passed over an alternative piece of legislation to RICO that would have
simply amended the Clayton Act to include remedies for racketeering. Id.
55. Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
56. The Congressional Statement of Findings and Purposes in RICO states:
Itisthe purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime
in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidencegathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
The perception of RICO as first
and foremost compensatory neglects the
fact that the civil provisions were developed as an alternative to the criminal
provisions to further this war on crime. "Congress' concern [under RICO],"
Justice Marshall noted, "was not for the direct victims of the racketeers' acts
whom state and federal laws already protected, but for the competitors and investors whose businesses and interests are harmed or destroyed by racketeers,
or whose competitive positions decline because of infiltration in the relevant
market." Sedima, 473 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Compensation, while not the primary objective of RICO was still a factor. Senator Hruska stated in debate:
[T]he [Act] also creates civil remedies for the honest businessman who
has been damaged by unfair competition from the racketeer businessman. Despite the willingness of the courts to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act to organized crime activities, as a practical matter, the
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procedural devices in RICO were meant primarily as alternative
weapons in the fight against organized crime 58 in lieu of, or in
conjunction with, the criminal penalties. "What is needed here,"
the drafters stressed, "are new approaches that will deal not only
with individuals, but also with the economic base [of organized
crime] . . .[i]n short, an attack must be made on their source of
economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all avail59
able fronts."
On the civil "front," Congress opted for the private enforcement mechanism that proved effective in the antitrust areatreble damages awards. 60 Although treble damages were integrated into the statute relatively late in RICO's drafting, 6' the
purpose of using a multiplier for damages was clear. Congress
intended the criminal penalties to reduce the actual numbers of
racketeers while the civil penalty was intended to reduce the
amount of racketeering generally. 62 To accomplish this latter objective, treble damages were designed not just to punish businesses found guilty under RICO but to actually ruin them 63 and
legitimate businessman does not have adequate civil remedies available
under that Act. This [Act] fills that gap.
ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 87 n.98 (quoting 115 CONG. REC. 6,993 (1969)
(statement of Sen. Hruska)).
58. Id. at 86 (remarks of Sen. Hruska).
59. S.REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Section 1964(c) provides: "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this
chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
61. ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 87-89.
62. In his statement to the Senate in 1969, President Nixon observed that:
"[tfhe arrest, conviction, and imprisonment of a Mafia lieutenant can curtail operations, but does not put the syndicate out of business. As long as the property
of organized crime remains, new leaders will step forward to take the place of
those we jail." Id. at 94 (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 105, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1969)); see also id. at 95 (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79
(1969) (statement of J. Mitchell, U.S. Att'y Gen.) ("While the prosecutions of
organized crime leaders can seriously curtail the operations of the Cosa Nostra,
as long as the flow of money continues, such prosecutions will only result in a
compulsory retirement and promotion system as new people step forward to
take the place of those convicted.")).
63. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 532 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Ralston v.
Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1983)), vacated and remanded, 473
U.S. 922 (1985) (remanded for consideration in light of Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479
and American Nat'l Bank v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985)); Organized Crime
Control, Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 106-07 (1970) (RICO intended to
supplement criminal prosecutions of individual organized crime members with
"a vehicle for cleansing the streams of commerce of one of their most harmful
pollutants").
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thereby deliver "a mortal blow against the property interests of
64
organized crime."
The "mortal blow" of civil RICO would come ostensibly
from driving up the costs of racketeering for the racketeer. Most
of those costs are obviously derived from the RICO multiplier.
There is, however, the added cost inflicted upon a racketeering
firm through simple litigation expenses. RICO guarantees potential litigants attorney's fees, 65 liberal venue and service of process
provisions, 6 6 and the ability to join a large number of defendants 6 7 in an apparent effort to maximize the number of cases as
well as the amount of damages. These inducements were intended to bring about something akin to death by exposure by
driving up the racketeers' costs through repeated private actions
with a high likelihood of success. 6 8 As one court put it, "RICO's
lure of treble damages and attorney's fees draws litigants and law69
yers . . . like lemmings to the sea."
2.

The RICO Lottery: Penalty Maximization through
Excessive Rent-seeking

In its combination of high damages and easy prosecution,
Congress inadvertently created a more potent device for penalty
maximization than originally anticipated. Assuming litigation
costs are reasonably considered as penalties in themselves, a collateral benefit of this mix is the possible elevation of racketeering
costs due to excessive rent-seeking. 70 A "rent" has been defined
64. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 592 (1981) (quoting 116 CONG.
827 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan)).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
66. Id. § 1965(a).
67. Id. § 1965. RICO trials are often referred to as "mega-trials" because
of the large number of defendants joined, usually in criminal cases like the famous twenty-two defendant, "Pizza-connection" mafia trial in the Southern District of New York. See generally Moss, Mega-Trials: Risks and Rewards, 74 A.B.A. J.
74 (Mar. 1, 1988). Recently, a district court held that such trials are prejudicial
to the defendants and tax the court system and, accordingly, severed the fourteen-defendant RICO case. United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736 (E.D.N.Y.
1987).
68. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 532 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 473 U.S. 922 (1985) (remanded for consideration in light of Sedima, 473
U.S. at 479 and American Nat'l Bank v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
69. Wolin v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 890, 891 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (citation omitted).
70. The following discussion of rent-seeking will be using that term only in
its more general sense. For the purposes of this paper, rent-seeking is used to
refer to the excessive side of rent-seeking. The ironic twist in this context is that
the villain of social welfare economists-excessive rent-seeking-may be highly
valued in the RICO area.
REC.
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as a "payment to a resource owner over and above the amount his
resources could command in their next-best alternative use."' 7'
Rent-seeking occurs where there are scarce resources competing
for a particular transfer of a good or service. 72 While rent-seeking is a normal part of a competitive economy, the welfare costs
73
of excessive rent-seeking are potentially very high.
In his article Efficient Rent Seeking, Gordon Tullock presents an
analysis of the rent-seeking phenomenon through a simple lottery
analogy.7 4 The lottery is composed of two players with a $100
prize at stake. 75 Each player, Tullock shows, will invest according
to what he thinks the other party will do. 7 6 The optimal investment will depend on the ability of both players to gauge the best
77
strategy in terms of the possible return on their investment.
When excessive rent-seeking occurs in the lottery, social waste results; the aggregate total spent on the rent-seeking exceeds the
value of the rent itself.78 In addition, under this example we see
how an increase in the value of the prize will result in an increase
in the level of rent-seeking.
The use of the Tullock's lottery example can be used to better understand RICO's "litigation lottery." The socially optimal
solution for RICO is to drive up the costs for defendants in proportion to their likelihood of being convicted and thereby the
likelihood of their being true racketeers. This might, in fact, be
achieved under the present system through the incentives for
plaintiffs to press promising claims. In a case with a substantive
charge, the plaintiff can be expected to spend a comparatively
large amount of money on the suit since the probability of his
prevailing is fairly high and, should he do so, all costs would be
borne ultimately by the defendant. 79 Conversely, the plaintiff
71. R. EKELUND & R. TOLLISON, MERCANTILISM AS A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY
18 (1981).
72. Id. at 19.
73. Id. at 19 n.2.
74. Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking in Goldberg, Readings in the Economics of
Contract Law 56 (1985) (unpublished manuscript).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 60.
79. One of the collateral benefits of civil RICO's guarantee of attorney's
fees is that plaintiffs are less likely to be "scared off" by institutional defendants
with threats of a "paper blizzard." Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 847 n.83 (quoting Corrigan, Rolling Back RICO, 18:5 NAT'L J. 2114, 2116 (1986)). Similarly,
another commentator notes that "[a]ttorney's fees ... also discourages [sic] unscrupulous defendants from conducting dilatory and unnecessarily expensive lit-
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would elect to spend less when conviction, and thereby attorney's
fees and costs, are far less certain. 80 In cases where there is a high
likelihood of conviction, therefore, both the plaintiff and the defendant can be expected to spend excessively. The plaintiff will
spend in the confidence that a conviction can be obtained with an
award of his costs, while the defendant will invest comparatively
in order to avoid a large potential loss. Where a plaintiff is less
than sure of his chance of winning the suit, he will want to minimize costs and would be therefore expected to lower his invest8
ment accordingly. '
There are, however, obvious weaknesses in penalty maximization revealed by the lottery analogy. That the rent in civil
RICO is of an unknown value will likely lead to some degree of
excessive rent-seeking in low probability conviction cases, though
it should still be less than that involved in a case with a high conviction probability. 8 2 Moreover, in the absence of actual knowledge of precisely what damages will be accessed, neither party can
be assured that the opposing party will invest according to Tullock's logical format. 83 Consequently, society may successfully
force excessive spending by racketeers in cases where there is a
high likelihood of conviction at the possible cost of increasing excessive rent-seeking in cases where there is a low likelihood of
84
conviction.
igation in the hope of reducing or eliminating the value of the litigation for the
plaintiff." Id. (quoting Budeiri, The PriorConviction Requirement: Repeal of Private
Civil RICO, 4 RICO L. REP. 336, 337 (1986)).
80. This natural selection of stronger cases is already quite common in areas like medical and legal malpractice where contingency fees are widely used.
Plaintiff firms will be reluctant to take on low probability cases, particularly with
the expanded use of rule 11 sanctions in federal courts. Blakey, The Act Is Neither
Anti-Business Nor Pro-Business, It's Pro-Victim, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 26, 1985, at 24, col. 2
(noting there is no evidence of problem with frivolous suits under RICO and
that current sanctions are more than adequate to handle those that do exist); see
also Hearings, supra note 35, at 361-62 (statement of Steven Twist, Chief Ass't
Att'y Gen., State of Arizona) ("There is scant evidence that RICO has created
baseless litigation in any greater proportion than other causes of action ....
[T]here is now no empirical data that shows RICO is more abused than an 'average' cause of action.").
81. Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 846-47 ("Counsel fees are essential because they encourage litigants to undertake complex cases and discourage defendants from resisting valid claims with a barrage of motion practice.").
82. Although excessive rent-seeking in low probability conviction cases
might occur, the prosecution of frivolous civil RICO suits does not appear to be
the systemic problem. See supra note 80.
83. Tullock, supra note 74, at 56.
84. Id. at 60-62. The election of the parties to ligitate in most cases under
RICO (when they should otherwise settle) can be viewed as an enhancement of
RICO's penalty maximization scheme.
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The unwillingness to settle would be enhanced under civil
RICO for two reasons. First, a defendant is not likely to offer a
settlement figure anywhere near the amount of the potential damages. This is because RICO's whole objective is to set damage
awards at a sum great enough to ruin, or at least cripple, a racketeering business. Secondly, the unusually high prizes and easy
prosecution under civil RICO undermine the motivation for
plaintiffs to settle civil disputes.8 5 Moreover, even if litigation
costs under RICO threaten to dwarf actual damages, the unknown nature of RICO's usually high penalty will often sustain
8 6
penalty-maximizing, rent-seeking behavior.
B.

The Clayton Act: Cost Minimization

Clayton Act remedies operate under a principle fundamentally in conflict with penalty maximization. Under the Clayton
Act, costs to the violator are minimized so that antitrust damages
will deter only those inefficient violations with negative net allocative results. The concept of cost minimization was imported from
the criminal context where it was applied in a study by Gary
Becker in his seminal work, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.8 7 In his study of criminal penalties, Becker argued that, in
establishing the penalty for a crime, society should consider three
types of costs: (1) the costs of the occurrence of the violation itself; (2) the processing costs involved in apprehending and convicting the violator; and (3) the costs of administering the
punishment.88
Society, according to Becker, must seek to minimize these
85. Id. at 60-62. But cf. Hearings, supra note 35, at 127 (statement by U.S.
Ass't Att'y Gen. Stephen S. Trott) (Department of Justice study showed that
sixty-one percent of 163 civil RICO cases surveyed were voluntarily terminated
by agreement of parties before trial).
86. One commentator recently noted that since "most antitrust suits are
settled now at close to actual damages ... it may be necessary to authorize treble
damages to assure that deserving victims received actual damage in the RICO
area." Hearings, supra note 35, at 416 (statement of the Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen.
and Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n) (emphasis in original); see also Goldsmith, supra note
43, at 837 n.42 (quoting Lacovara, Wright & Aronow, Legislative Reform of Civil
RICO: The Business Community's Perspective, in LAw & BUSINESS, INC., CIVIL RICO
LITIGATION 240-41 (1985) ("The mere threat of a private RICO suit produces
settlements because the risk of treble damages, attorney's fees, expensive discovery, and the public label 'racketeer.' ")).
87. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968). The following cost minimization discussion benefits greatly from
Schwartz' economic study of antitrust damages. See Schwartz, An Overview of the
Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEo. L.J. 1075 (1980).
88. Becker, supra note 87, at 170-80.
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costs and reach the most advantageous level of damages by trading off increases and decreases among these three categories.8 9
"Consequently," one commentator wrote, "sanctions of equal
value can be generated by varying the frequency of punishment
inversely with the severity of punishment." 90 Obviously the danger to be avoided in this process is to have a level of damages that
is too high or too low. 9 ' In the former case, society will be spending an excessive amount of money on enforcement while deterring too much of the proscribed behavior. 9 2 In the latter case,
society will pay the price for not deterring enough of the proscribed behavior. 9 3 The objective is to decide on a price "where
the costs associated with a marginal increase in price would exceed the cost savings resulting from the decreased incidence of
the harmful conduct." 94 This balancing is probably most familiar
to students of contracts in the context of the "efficient breach."
Although the "efficient breach" is not the result of strict cost minimization, the notion behind the "efficient breach" is that society
will benefit from a breach when the benefits from a breach are
greater than the resulting damages. 9 5 Society encourages such
breaches in an attempt to optimally allocate its resources.96
The raison d'etre of cost minimization under the Clayton Act,
therefore, is the efficient antitrust violation. In this way, damages
under cost minimization serve a more sophisticated purpose than
under penalty maximization where they are simply the final, definitive result of RICO's bankruptcy forcing provisions. In the
Clayton Act, damages become a part of a winnowing out process
through which society deters only those violations with less value
to the violator than detriment to society.
The great challenge in the Clayton Act's use of damages,
however, is the need to calculate the social harm caused by some
violations. 9 7 The selective deterrence of inefficient antitrust violations is necessarily linked to society's ability to gauge the harm
incurred through antitrust violations. In some monopolies, computing social costs may be accomplished by simply comparing the
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Schwartz, supra note 87, at 1076.
Id. at 1076-77.
Id. at 1079-80.
Id. at 1080.
Id.
Id.
Speidel, The Borderland of Contract, 10 N. Ky. L.
Id. at 166-68.
Schwartz, supra note 87, at 1079.
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pre- and post-monopoly prices. Nevertheless, due to the difficulty of measuring diffuse or hidden costs,9 the measurement of
damages in most private antitrust cases never truly corresponds
to the actual social harm caused by the antitrust violation. 9 9
Rather, courts generally accept the plaintiff's damages as rough
corollaries of social harm. Plaintiff losses in antitrust cases, therefore, take on an added dimension as measures of social losses.
Antitrust violations promising greater returns to the violator than
losses to the plaintiff are deemed efficient and beneficial for society while all other violators are sharply curtailed.
The use of plaintiff losses in this way has been encouraged by
leading antitrust theoreticians. Schwartz, for example, argues
that plaintiff losses are essential in determining allocative harm
caused by monopoly pricing. Although plaintiff losses are not
mirror images of societal losses, Schwartz writes, "it is possible
that the measures of damages, although not explicitly focusing on
allocative consequences, might represent reasonable proxies for
social harm."' 0 0 If efficiency is the sole goal of antitrust regulations, plaintiff losses will at least place the line of demarcation
between inefficient and efficient violations high enough to have a
net beneficial societal result.
The realization of the efficient antitrust violation is a goal
central to the Clayton Act's cost minimization approach, yet distinctly foreign to RICO's penalty maximization scheme.' 0 ' As
will be shown below, RICO's aversion to the efficiency goals of
98. Dorman, The Casefor Compensation: Why Compensatory Components Are Requiredfor Efficient Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEo. L. J. 1113, 1115 (1980).
99. Schwartz, supra note 87, at 1084.
100. Id. Note that, according to Judge Posner, to translate the figure measuring social harm into a penalty would be inefficient, even if it could be calculated. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 236 (2d ed. 1977). "[T]he
effective deterrence of the [violator]," writes Posner, "does not require a monetary penalty as large as the social costs of the violation, since those social costs
are not received as gains by the [violator]." Id.
101. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 532 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 473 U.S. 922 (1985) (remanded for consideration in light of Sedima, 473
U.S. at 479 and American Nat'l Bank v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985)). The
Furman court succinctly stated the divergent purposes behind antitrust and racketeering damages:
Antitrust regulation is designed to promote marketplace competition
and is increasingly focused on market efficiency rather than harm suffered by individual businesses. RICO, on the other hand, is not concerned with either market efficiency or promoting competition, but
instead is designed to inflict severe financial injury on those who commit crimes in operating an enterprise or who use an enterprise to insulate themselves from less severe penalties.
Id. (citations omitted).
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the Clayton Act is the result of a perception by RICO's drafters
that racketeering was fundamentally and irredeemably harmful to
society.
PART II
THE CLAYTON ACT APPROACH AND RACKETEERING:
PRICING A MALUM IN SE CRIME

The notion of an "efficient violation" separates RICO from

the policies underlying the Clayton Act. Legislative debate on
civil RICO precludes any suggestion that Congress envisioned an
"efficient racketeering violation" under the Act.' 0 2 "[T]o the extent," one court noted "that antitrust law and policy are increasingly concerned primarily with market efficiency rather than the
deleterious effects of concentrated market power itself, analogies
to that body of law become increasingly irrelevant, since the exercise of social power by organized crime is thought to be malum in
se."1

0 3

The perception of racketeering as malum in se is fundamental
to an understanding of the intrinsic conflict between these two
acts. Unlike antitrust violations that are viewed as having some
deleterious effects when efficient, RICO violations were considered so inherently bad as to require a system of sanctions rather
than prices. The malum in se community standard is in many ways
the linchpin between Congress' intention to deprive racketeers of
any racketeering gains and the eventual sanctioning device
04
adopted by Congress.1
The price versus sanction distinction was developed largely
by Cooter in his seminal work, Prices and Sanctions.10 5 Cooter divided all damages between these two polars. 10 6 Antitrust damages are often viewed as "prices"' 0 7 set by the state, which must
102. See, e.g., Organized Crime Control, Hearings on S.30 and Related Proposals

Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10607 (1970) ("The improved remedies and procedures of title IX offer the first real
hope for advancing the federal effort against organized crime... and promise to

provide a vehicle for cleansing the streams of commerce of one of their most
harmful pollutants."); see also ABA

REPORT,

supra note 8, at 94-95.

103. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir.) (footnote omitted)
(emphasis supplied by court), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
104. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 835 ("[T]reble damages serve a
socially desirable compensatory function."); cf. Goldsmith & Keith, supra note
26, at 81 ("[O]nce the extent of fraud in our society has been recognized, pro-

viding victims with treble damages seems neither drastic nor inappropriate.").
105. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).
106. Id. at 1524-25.
107. Schwartz, supra note 87, at 1080.
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be paid for an activity to occur.'0 8 Along these same lines, a pricing system is closely correlated with external costs so that a violation's price increases with a comparative increase in the degree of
external harm. i0 9 Pricing systems are thus more harm-oriented
and cost minimizing by nature. In planning its future conduct, a
firm will consider these prices as any other cost of doing business."10 Many theorists would argue that, if the behavior contemplated would still be profitable after discounting the price
imposed by society, such behavior results in efficient allocation of
resources and should be encouraged."I
Conversely, a sanction is a detriment imposed by society to
prevent an activity from occurring." 2 Unlike a price, which will
increase with the external costs, a sanction will increase with the
need for deterrence.' 13 The need for deterrence, moreover, is
often indicated by the nature of the actor's intent when committing the violation." 4 Consequently, even if external costs are
roughly equal, society might legitimately impose a heavier sanction on those violators who act intentionally or deliberately while
5
lowering the sanction for unintentional or spontaneous actors.'l
The central concern of a sanction is to deter the violation while
the central concern in pricing is the proper internalization of the
costs resulting from the violation.' 16 A sanction will often involve
a multiplier of the actual damages and bear little practical relation
to the injury itself, save the base figure subject to multiplication.
Congress' imposition of a sanctioning system under RICO
stems from its adherence to the community standard of racketeering as malum in se. Congress never embraced the notion of the
"efficient racketeering," but rather insisted that racketeering
firms be eliminated altogether. 1 7 Market considerations and
108. Id. at 1079-85; Cooter, supra note 105, at 1525 ("[A] price is a payment

of money which is required in order to do what is permitted.") (emphasis in
original).
109. Cooter, supra note 105, at 1537-38.
110. Id. at 1525-30.
111. See, e.g., Markovits, The Functions, Allocative Efficiency, and Legality of Tie-

Ins: A Comment, 28J. L. & ECON. 387 (1985).
112. Cooter, supra note 105, at 1537.

113. Id. at 1537-38.
114. Id. at 1537.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1983); see also
Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1985) ("RICO was designed to
make life hard for repeat violators of the criminal law, and it must be generously
construed to promote the goal of deterrence.").
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cost-benefit analysis are foreign to the RICO area." l8 One court
emphasized this difference between the two acts by noting that in
the antitrust area "[o]ne less business in a given area will increase
concentration, thus decreasing competition [while in the racketeering area] it does not matter if an illegal business activity is
ruined-indeed that is exactly what RICO is endeavoring to accomplish."119 Notions of Pareto efficiency where one party gains
without worsening the position of any other party are plainly absent in the community standard underlying RICO's damages
section.
Congress' intended use of the trebling multiplier as a sanction, to ruin racketeers without distinction, has miffed numerous
courts' 20 and commentators. 12 1 These critics point to the adoption of the broader base for damages as amounting to an unjust
windfall for plaintiffs. Of particular concern for scholars are contractually related predicate acts which entail expectation or restitution interests. 12 2 In arguing for the Clayton Act approach, one
commentator gives the example of a case involving a corporate
insider who buys stock from his shareholders for $40,000 only to
sell the same stock two years later for $700,000.123 In that case,
Janigan v. Taylor, 124 the court awarded restitutionary damages of
$700,000, or 17.5 times the purchase price received by the plaintiffs.'25 The commentator correctly notes that, had this case been
brought under RICO, the $700,000 in damages could have been
trebled.'

26

TheJanigan example illustrates the implicit preference often
revealed in RICO studies for harm-oriented damages and pricings. When viewed in terms of antitrust theory, such potential
awards appear excessive and inefficient. As a price, the multiplier
in Janigan would clearly be too high and its effect would be to
118. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 532 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 473 U.S. 922 (1985) (remanded for consideration in light of Sedima,
473 U.S. at 479 and American Nat'l Bank v. Haroco, Inc. 473 U.S. 606 (1985));
Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources, Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,742, at 93,737 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
119. Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
120. For a listing of such courts, see Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 388 n.4 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
121. Id. at 404-05.
122. Parnon, supra note 26, at 352-53.
123. Id. at 353 n.40.
124. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
125. Parnon, supra note 26, at 353 n.40.
126. Id.
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allow too little of the activity to occur. 12 7 Congress, however,
sought not to establish a price, but a sanction and, as such, a multiplier of 52.5 on the original purchase price may be valid. As
Cooter notes, "[a] sanction typically creates an abrupt jump in an
individual's costs when he passes from the permitted zone into
the forbidden zone where behavior is sanctioned."'' 28 Moreover,
the use of pricing logic in the RICO area illustrates the difficulty
of applying certain economic values to areas like racketeering
which involves offenses considered malum in se. "[T]he economic
perspective," Cooter points out, "is blind to the distinctively normative aspect of law, viewing a sanction for doing what is forbidden merely as the price for what is permitted."' 29 Furthermore,
as shown below, the theoretical quandary involved in using cost
minimization in a malum in se area is complicated further by difficult practical problems.
A.

Dangers of Hidden Costs and Perverse Incentives
Under Cost Minimization

The community standard issue aside, the very act of employing cost minimization in RICO requires some sort of calculation
of the costs of a racketeering violation to society.13 0 As was mentioned earlier, this can be often done in the antitrust area with
relative accuracy because of the quantifiable nature of the violation. ' 3 ' Racketeering, however, encompasses a wide range of violations in an assortment of areas.' 3 2 While governmental studies
estimate the social cost of fraud at $200 billion annually,' 33 these
studies are hampered by a lack of reliable information on the level
of fraud occurring undetected in society and, therefore, vary
widely in both methodology and conclusion. 3 4 This information
127. It should be noted that a price can theoretically involve a multiplier if
the base figure, when multiplied, will accurately reflect social costs. See infra
notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
128. Cooter, supra note 105, at 1523.
129. Id.
130. For a discussion of cost minimization, see supra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
131. R. POSNER, supra note 100, at 234. This is not to suggest that concealability problems do not exist in antitrust, but rather that the problems are on
the whole less than those encountered in the racketeering area.
132. ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 71-72.

133.

UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY

42 (1984) ("White collar crime results in the loss of $200 billion annually from our national economy .... ").
134. Congressional Research Serv., Library of Congress, Fraud in Defense Procurement 2 (May 15, 1986) (containing estimate of between $23 billion to $38 billion
GENERAL
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deficiency could produce serious systemic consequences under a
pricing system.
The high information requirements of pricing systems was
aptly shown by Cooter. 3 5 In order to use a pricing system,
Cooter argued, costs of all violations must be internalized by the
price so that only violations that "pay their own way" will be encouraged. This price, therefore, must include the harm suffered
by the victims and the costs of enforcement. The value of a victim's loss and a society's enforcement, moreover, must be adjusted by the probability of an offender's prosecution. "If
benefits and costs are balanced at the margin, then the number of
crimes would be relatively elastic with respect to the price, so er3 6
rors in computing damages would affect the amount of crime."1
Large errors are likely to be prevalent under pricing systems,
Cooter continued, since calculating the costs of an offense to a
class of victims is naturally empirical and imprecise.' 3 7 As a result, sanctioning systems are inherently superior to pricing sys38
tems since the information requirements are much lower.
The presence of an information deficiency renders cost minimization and its pricing scheme untenable in any regulatory
scheme since the underlying system of pricing requires a firm
projection of societal harm.' 3 9 When a standard for behavior is
known, while the cost of deviations from that standard is not,
sanctions are normally required. 40 The major reason for this
preference is the inherent elasticity of behavior under pricing systems. 14 1 There is a high degree of behavioral responsiveness to
pricing changes. This general sensitivity to pricing systems can
of losses annually); Congressional Research Serv., Library of Congress, Drug
Fraud 1 (containing estimate of $10 billion in losses annually). For an excellent
listing of these and other studies on fraud, see Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 83334 n.31.
135. Cooter, supra note 105, at 1550.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. In addition to the antitrust area, the notion of pricing violations has
also taken hold in the environmental field where the government actively sells
"pollution rights" under the Clean Air Act. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For a variation of the
pollution right, the "pollution tax," see Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1982).
140. Cooter, supra note 105, at 1532-36.
141. Id. at 1524 ("Since behavior is relatively responsive to prices, an error
in setting an official price will have a large effect on behavior; since behavior is
relatively unresponsive to the level of a sanction, modest errors in the level of
sanctions will have little effect upon behavior.").
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be especially dangerous in areas with a high concealability factor.' 4 2 Since behavior will fluctuate consistently with price
changes, a pricing (and the data supporting it) must insure a high
degree of accuracy.' 43 Yet, errors in calculating costs are probably inevitable in the furtive world of the racketeer where hidden
costs necessarily accompany hidden acts. 144 Thus, the information deficiency under RICO is likely to be far more acute than in
other, less clandestine areas.
In addition to the information deficiency impasse in using a
pricing system in RICO, there is also a second practical problem
concerning the implications of awarding damages to plaintiffs for
the harm they incur. Ironically, the use of a harm-oriented measurement of damages might actually result in an incentive for victims to prolong racketeering enterprises so as to increase their
losses.145 If a person can only treble lost profits, increased business costs, and the decreased value of his business, as under the
Clayton Act, a victim may find it advantageous to delay prosecuting a racketeer until the racketeer's activities (and thereby the victim's losses) are increased.' 4 6 This moral hazard-or "perverse
incentive"-would only be enhanced by procedural or evidentiary
advantages afforded plaintiffs. A potential litigant would have the
perverse incentive to work in silent collusion to increase his
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The difficulty in computing the social costs of a RICO violation, a necessity under a cost minimization system, is only compounded by the difficulty in
finding the proper multiplier. While we will consider this more in the following
section, it should be noted that the size of the antitrust multiplier is usually tied
to the concealability of the offense. Theoretically, the multiplier should increase
with the difficulty of detecting a violation. Consequently, if one of three antitrust violations can be detected and prosecuted on the average, then the multiplier might be two. In cases where the concealability factor is low, as in a
merger, Judge Posner has argued for the rejection of treble damages. R. PosNER, supra note 100, at 235. For trebling to be an efficient vehicle, the
probability of detection, according to Posner, must be less than one, otherwise
single remedies should be employed.
The concealability notion of economic theory is hardly an arcane matter, yet
its application to RICO would be prohibitively complex. As noted earlier, the
data on the amount of racketeering remains sketchy at best. The concealability
of a violation can only be gauged after one estimates the rough incidence of
violations in a population. Consequently, calibrating the relative size of the multiplier by a concealability factor in the RICO context would be illusory and
unsupportable.
145. See generally Breit & Elzinga, PrivateAntitrust Enforcement: The New Learning, 28 J. L. & ECON. 405, 430-33 (1985); Butler, Restricted Distribution Contracts
and the OpportunisticPursuit of Treble Damages, 59 WASH. L. REV. 27, 51 (1983).
146. Breit & Elzinga, supra note 145, at 430-33; Butler, supra note 145, at
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losses, in anticipation of an eventual damages multiplier, rather
than to take action to reduce his losses.
The danger of perverse incentives is vividly illustrated in a
case discussed by Breit and Elzinga. In that case, a drive-in theatre owner kept two sets of books in anticipation of an antitrust
suit in which he would star as the victimized small businessman:
one showing his artificially low profits arising from the violation
and another showing the treble damages he could expect under
the antitrust laws. 14 7 Similarly, RICO's adoption of the Clayton
Act approach could well invite such opportunistic pursuit, perhaps leading to unnecessarily prolonged associations between
racketeering victims and racketeers.' 48 Although the present
penalty-maximizing scheme under RICO would no doubt bestow
greater benefit upon the plaintiff than would simple Clayton Act
damages, the perverse incentive experienced under a gains-oriented measurement of damages is likely to be less than that encountered under a harm-oriented measurement (where a
plaintiff's collateral losses are subject to trebling).' 4 9
B.

Returning to Gain-orientedMeasurement Under RICO

As we have seen so far, RICO was devised to place a sanction
on racketeering. This stands in contradiction to the basic approach of the Clayton Act's cost minimization which places a
price on antitrust violations so that efficient violations might still
occur. RICO's damages provision illustrates Congress' inability
to correlate the community standard underlying RICO with an
established method of computing damages. On the one hand,
Congress incorporated into RICO the harm-oriented damages
language borrowed from the Clayton Act which, as we have seen,
is vital to reaching efficient violations. Yet, on the other hand,
Congress clearly considered the possibility of balancing racketeer
costs and benefits to be unacceptable. 50 The gain-oriented (penalty-maximizing) purposes of RICO were essentially grafted onto
the harm-oriented (cost-minimizing) provision borrowed from
147. Breit & Elzinga, supra note 145, at 431 (citing Woolner Theatres, Inc.
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 333 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. La. 1970)).
148. Butler, supra note 145, at 51-52. There is no indication that perverse
incentive problems are common under the present system. Perverse incentives,
often considered in the antitrust area, are discussed here as an added contrast
between gain- and harm-oriented measurements.
149. For a discussion of the Clayton Act damage measurement, see infra
notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
150. Nathan, supra note 2, at 10.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss2/1

26

Turley: The RICO Lottery and the Gains Multiplication Approach: An Altern

1988]

MEASURING CIVIL

RICO

DAMAGES

the Clayton Act by expanding the base for trebling. The use of
the predicate acts,15 instead of the limited categories of the Clayton Act, to supply the trebling base under RICO allows penalty
maximization to occur and insures that the ill-gotten gains of the
racketeer will be redistributed.
Nevertheless, seen as a harm-oriented system of measuring
damages, RICO's predicate act approach differs little structurally
from the Clayton Act. Under the predicate act approach, after the
plaintiff has proven that his injuries were caused by the predicate
acts, these damages automatically become subject to possible
trebling. While the result is slightly different under the Clayton
Act, it is a difference only in degree. That is, under the Clayton
Act, while harm-oriented damages are trebled, the base categories of damages subject to trebling are smaller, and thus the plaintiff's damages award will be less.
In enacting civil RICO, Congress appears to have envisioned
a gain-oriented, rather than a harm-oriented, measurement of
damages. 152 Legislative history indicates that Congress intended
civil RICO damages to ruin racketeering businesses or, in the very
least, to deprive businesses of their racketeering profits.1 5 3 Citing
the legislative debate over the passage of RICO, the Supreme
Court, in United States v. Turkette, concluded that "[t]he aim [of
civil RICO] is to divest the [racketeering] association of the fruits
of ill-gotten gains."' 54 Other federal courts have found this
stated purpose determinative in rejecting limitations on damages
based on an analogy to Clayton Act damages.' 55 "Such a rule
[limiting damages]," one court stated, "would leave money derived from actions prohibited by RICO precisely where Congress
56
did not intend it to remain, in the hands of RICO violators."'
The import of this interpretation is that Congress intended for
civil RICO damages to center on the profits made through racketeering. This is not to say that a harm-oriented measurement of
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
152. For a discussion of the purpose of civil RICO, see supra notes 56-86
and accompanying text.
153. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981).
154. Id.
155. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1002 (1983); Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1320 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1578 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Kimmel v.
Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 489-90 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Crocker Nat'l Bank v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49-50 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
156. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 50 (N.D.
Cal. 1982).
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damages could not work to deprive racketeers of profits, but simply that the emphasis of RICO is on racketeering gains rather
than its harm. More importantly, harm-oriented damages are
most useful in facilitating the "efficient violation" where the profits outweigh the costs to society. 15 7 This efficiency notion, as previously shown, is alien to Congress' view of racketeering as malum
inse.
PART III
FOCUSED PENALTY MAXIMIZATION:

THE GAINS

MULTIPLICATION APPROACH

The discussion in the preceding section described how Congress utilized a system of penalty maximization and sanctions to
combat the malum in se crime of racketeering. It was further
shown how penalty maximization is better suited to the task of
deterring racketeers than the Clayton Act's (harm-oriented) cost
minimization because of the latter's problems of information deficiency and perverse incentives. We must now turn to the question of the proper damages approach under civil RICO. On this
point, RICO's blind penalty maximization and the use of sanctions part company. Although sanctions are intended to deter violations, this deterrence is usually not intended to be
accomplished at any cost, but rather should be adjusted to ruin
only those offenders displaying some particular characteristics
such as premeditation or recidivism. RICO, as we have seen, was
designed to ruin racketeers, if necessary, without distinguishing

between the types of racketeers. In reaching some conclusion as
to the optimal sanction, these two notions must be reconciled
with the special problems that attend racketeering.
A.

Distinguishing Between Fractionaland Substantial Racketeers

After opting for a sanctioning rather than a pricing system, a
policy-maker must grapple with the size of that sanction. i58 What
little consideration commentators have given this subject has
tended to link the size of the sanction with the intent of the violator.'

59

This is integrally related to the purpose of sanctioning

which is to discourage what Cooter refers to as the "exceptional
actor."' 60 This character type finds paying compensatory dam157. Cooter, supra note 105, at 1524-31.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1543.
160. Id.
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ages cheaper than adhering to the community standard. Cooter
argues that, in setting a sanction, the policy-maker must account
for two classes of violators: those who intentionally, deliberately,
or repeatedly violate the standard and those whose violations are
unintentional or spontaneous.' 6 1 The result is that the size of the
sanction is not only determined by the mental state of the violator, but, as we will see, is inevitably set to thwart the behavior of
the most socially deviant class or, in this context, those most reliant on racketeering.

16 2

Exceptional actors normally include recidivists and other violators whose conduct falls substantially short of the social norm.
These individuals can be referred to as "substantial racketeers"
because of their substantial reliance on racketeering proceeds.
Conversely, the racketeers who are only fractionally reliant on the
proceeds from racketeering can be referred to as "fractional racketeers." Due to his fractional reliance, a racketeer of this latter
type will likely adopt behavior only a fraction below the social
norm. Cooter anticipated that the discongruity between these
two groups would be rectified by the adoption of a sanction severe enough that "even the exceptional injurer will minimize his
expected cost by conforming to the legal standard."' 163 Practically, therefore, the sanction will be set by reference to the most
deviant class: the substantial racketeer. Accordingly, a sanction
cannot be too low if it is to have a real impact on the substantial
racketeer.
If it is clear that a sanction can be too low, can it be too high?
One answer is that a sanction out of proportion to the social costs
of the violation will lead to rampant inefficiency by disallowing
violations which would bring more benefit to a party than harm to
society. 164 Yet this solution, as we saw earlier, is difficult to rec161. Id. at 1537.
162. An analogous point was made in testimony on civil RICO before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary:
If our society authorizes the recovery of only actual damages for deliberate anti-social conduct engaged in for profit, it lets the perpetrator
know that if he is caught, he need only return the misappropriated
sums. If he is not caught, he may keep his ill-gotten gains, and even if
he is caught and sued, he knows that he may be able to defeat part of
the damages claims or at least compromise it. In short, the balance of
risk under traditional simple damage recovery provides little disincentive to those who engage in such conduct.
Hearings, supra note 35, at 415 (statement of the Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. and
Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n).
163. Cooter, supra note 105, at 1544.
164. Breit & Elzinga, supra note 145, at 410.
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oncile with the assumptions underlying RICO. The social costs of
racketeering defy computation. 16 5 Moreover, even if they were
capable of calculation, the malum in se community standard presupposes the absence of an efficient level of racketeering. Another answer is that it would unjustly enrich opportunistic
plaintiffs. 166 This would only be relevant, however, if the purpose
of the Act. were purely compensatory. 6 7 Quite to the contrary,
RICO is first and foremost a penalty-maximizing statute and is
largely unconcerned with who gets the damages so long as the
violator's resources are duly depleted.
A more provocative answer to this question might be that it is
disadvantageous to pummel the businesses of fractional racketeers when society may want to reform, rather than ruin, this class
of racketeers. While the community standard and the Act fail to
differentiate between the fractional and the substantial racketeer,
distinguishing between these two classes would have two principal advantages. First, society can encourage businesses to minimize practices of racketeering by modifying the eventual penalty
to reflect the degree of reliance of the particular firm on such
practices. Second, society can avoid the social costs of crippling
or ruining fractional businesses by setting a sanction which punishes such businesses only to the point of barring any "efficient
racketeering."
B.

Gain-orientedDamages and the Elasticity of Behavior

The inevitable social waste resulting from the blanket application of penalty maximization offers persuasive support for reforming, rather than ruining, fractional racketeers. Eradicating
substantial racketeers, however, without eliminating firms from
both groups indiscriminately, is a problem of delicate balancing.
There has been considerable debate on how to protect the fractional racketeer.' 68 Some commentators suggest that Congress
differentiate between acts or methods of racketeering, taking care
to specify the various damages for each. 16 9 This approach has
165. A 1982 study concluded that $200 billion are lost to fraud annually.
See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
166. See generally Breit & Elzinga, supra note 145, at 430-33; Butler, supra
note 145, at 51.
167. For a discussion of RICO as a penalty-maximizing statute, see supra
notes 70-86 & 112-29 and accompanying text.
168. While the term "fractional racketeer" is a creation of this Article, most
suggested limitations on the scope of the Act center on defendants with less
traditional or less substantial racketeering activities.
169. ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 276-78.
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been rightly attacked as unwieldy and imprecise. 170 Another plan
would eliminate mail, wire and securities fraud from the predicate
acts in order to reduce the number of persons prosecuted under
RICO. 17 This plan, however, would only reduce RICO's potential effectiveness by allowing those substantial racketeers detected
by the mail and wire fraud provisions to escape prosecution with
the fractional racketeers. RICO's weakness is not that it draws
too many types of racketeers into its net but rather that, once
racketeers are caught, the Act fails to sort them out in terms of
damages.
Other commentators have argued for measures similar to the
Clayton Act approach where a lower cap would be placed on the
allowable damages. 17 2 This idea would bar penalty maximizing,
however, even for substantial racketeers. Moreover, while fractional racketeers would be brought back into alignment with the
community standard, this would not likely bring highly deviant
social behavior up to the social norm. 17 3 Substantial racketeers
would likely engage in episodes of "efficient racketeering." High
potential damages, therefore, would be more advantageous to
avoid elasticity of behavior and to insure fatal penalty maximiza174
tion for substantial racketeers.
Recently, a legislative plan was introduced in Congress that
would have restricted the availability of treble damages only to
cases where the defendant had already been convicted criminally
under the Act.' 75 This amendment to civil RICO, contained in
H.R. 5445, passed the House of Representatives but was tabled in
170. Id. at 277.
171. Id. at 247-63. The advocates of this approach would certainly cut
down the number of civil RICO cases since an estimated ninety percent of civil
RICO cases that go to final judgment rely on mail, wire or security fraud as
predicate offenses. Id. at 243 ("About 57 percent of the cases involve solely or
primarily mail or wire fraud predicate offenses, 35 percent rely solely or primarily on allegations of securities fraud.").
172. Id. at 276-78; see also Parnon, supra note 26, at 349-54.
173. Cooter, supra note 105, at 1524.

174. Id. at 1532-36.
175. House Subcommittee Approves Bill Eliminating RICO's Treble Damage Provi-

sion, 2 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) 2 (Aug. 20, 1986); see also Goldsmith, supra note
43, at 855-59. This bill originally would have eliminated treble damages altogether. Similar efforts have been made in the antitrust area. In 1987 (when
H.R. 5445 was pending), two bills were introduced that would have eliminated
treble damages for the majority of antitrust violations. See S. 539, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1155, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); see also Remarks of
Assistant Attorney General Douglas H. Ginsburg to National Health Lawyers
Association on Health Care and Antitrust Reform Legislation (Jan. 16, 1986),
reprinted in 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1249, at 174 (Jan. 23,
1986).
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the Senate by a 47-44 vote. 176 This suggested modification to
civil RICO is interesting in that it would have presumably focused
civil RICO's penalty-maximizing sanction on substantial racketeers. This limitation on treble damages is, however, unadvisable
for many of the reasons considered earlier. Prosecutors are
widely known to have limited resources with which to prosecute
white-collar criminals. 17 7 Most fractional, and many substantial,
racketeers would very likely never receive a criminal conviction
8
that would make them subject to treble damages under the Act.17
Lost would be the needed deterrent for fractional racketeers.
Lost also would be one of the greatest advantages in opening the
"second front" against racketeers. It was precisely because prosecutors can only bring a limited number of racketeering cases that
Congress opted for the use of the private attorneys general that
had proven so successful in the antitrust area.' 79 Moreover, the
bill would succeed in effectively raising the standard of proof in
civil RICO cases-a change that critics of the Act have thus far
been unsuccessful in accomplishing through the courts.'8 0 Civil
RICO's standard of proof-by a preponderance of the evidencehas always displeased some courts' 8 ' and commentators 8 2 who
point to the Act's high damages and stigma as grounds for raising
176. 132 CONG. REc. S16,704 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986).
177. Blakey, supra note 80, at 28, col. 1 ("Public enforcement cannot be
relied upon to do the whole job of policing fraud.").
178. H.R. 5445 did allow for treble damages in actions brought by governmental agencies. For a reproduction of the bill, see Goldsmith, supra note 43, at
904-11. This authority, however, would do little to improve the Act's overall
deterrent effect, given the already limited ability of federal prosecutors to bring
fraud cases.
179. In the 1985 hearings on RICO, the Justice Department stated that
"[o]nly a small percentage of suspected [illegal] activities can be investigated
thoroughly, and only a fraction of those investigated can be effectively prosecuted. It was in recognition of these practical limitations that Congress elected
to augment governmental efforts against organized crime by encouraging private initiatives." RICO Reform: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 304 (1985-86) (1985)
(statement ofJ. Keeney, U.S. Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen.).
Similar concerns led to the creation of private enforcement mechanisms in
the antitrust area. The result is that eighty-four percent of all civil and criminal
antitrust cases, brought between 1960 and 1980, were instituted by private
plaintiffs. Blakey, supra note 80, at 28, col. 1 (studying 22,585 civil and criminal
cases).
180. See, e.g., Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1302 (7th Cir.
1987); Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 531 (9th Cir. 1987); Cullen
v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 731 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3266 (1987).
181. See Note, Government Corruption,supra note 43, at 1544 n.75 (citing standard of proof required by various courts).
182. See, e.g., Note, Enforcing Criminal Laws, supra note 43, at 1064.
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the standard. This change is partially achieved by requiring a
criminal conviction-under the higher criminal standard- before
treble damages can be sought in private, civil proceedings. The
logical outcome of this restriction is the virtual elimination of
treble damages in the vast majority of cases and, thereby, the loss
of most of civil RICO's penalty-maximizing potential.
To sum up, a major stumbling block in developing alternatives to the present RICO remedies is the capability, and acceptability, of distinguishing between fractional and substantial
racketeers. Yet, this distinction is not wholly at odds with Congress' underlying reason for penalty maximizing. There was certainly a perception among many of the congressmen who spoke in
the committee debates, that firms reliant on racketeering are not
likely to metamorphose into law-abiding businesses through fines
or other forms of government coercion. 8 3 Congress' objective to
ruin racketeers would make more sense for firms which are totally
or heavily reliant on racketeering for their profits. Such firms
could legitimately be considered socially parasitic and irredeemable. It may well be most efficient to redistribute the resources of
such firms back among the general population. In this way, after
separating these two racketeering types, a sanction would work as
a legal triage to disperse businesses too heavily reliant on racketeering to be reformed while supplying a sanction large enough
to deter racketeering by fractional firms by forcing these firms up
to the level of the social norm.18 4 This separation, moreover,
might be brought about by trebling the gains, rather than the
harm, produced by racketeering.
C.

The Impact and Use of Gain-orientedMeasurement in Four
Different Racketeering Situations

A gain-oriented measurement approach to RICO damages
would allow plaintiffs to receive treble the amount of the gains
that they could show were received by the defendant through the
racketeering. The impact that a shift from harm-oriented to gainoriented measurement would have on RICO cases would vary
radically depending upon the nature of the racketeering enterprise. For purposes of analysis, RICO cases can be broken down
into four principal groups: first, those cases where racketeering
183. See, e.g., S. REP., supra note 59, at 78 (noting that racketeering firms
easily replace convicted participants and continue illegal activities); see also ABA
REPORT, supra note 8, at 92-95.
184. Cooter, supra note 105, at 1527.
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gains equal the harm inflicted; second, those cases where the
gains are difficult or impossible to gauge; third, those cases where
the gains are greater than the harm; and fourth, those cases where
the gains are less than the harm. Each of these case groups will
be considered separately below in terms of what impact, if any, a
shift to gain-oriented measurement would have on actual damage
awards under RICO. As will be shown, only damages in two of
the case groups would be substantially affected by the use of gainoriented measurement of damages. It is in these two case groups,
not coincidentally, that the dangers associated with efficient violations and perverse incentives are most likely to be a problem.' 8 5
The first case group encompasses those situations where the
harm produced equals the gain derived from a racketeering enterprise. An example is the following: Fly'em High Flagpole Company, a fledgling flagpole business, contracts with Polecat, Inc., to
manufacture the fiberglass cylinders that Fly'em High uses to
make its flagpoles. Polecat assures Fly'em High in repeated telephone conversations that its AAA class fiberglass, when fashioned
into poles, can withstand two hundred-mile-an-hour winds. Unbeknownst to Fly'em High, who begins taking flagpole orders,
Polecat is in reality a fly-by-night company that produces fiberglass that will crimp under as little as a five-mile-an-hour breeze.
Polecat is able to hide this fact through the collusion of a Fly'em
High vice-president who falsifies test results. Fortunately for
Fly'em High, the technical flaw is caught before actual work is
done on the cylinders and the company is able to rely on another
manufacturer to meet its orders. Nevertheless, Fly'em High is out
of the $50,000 paid to Polecat for the flaccid fiberglass.
Fly'em High's case is illustrative of many situations where a
fraudulent enterprise results in harm to the plaintiff that is equal
to the defendant's gain. Since no work on the cylinders had begun (and assuming no lost-volume problem arises), Polecat's
$50,000 gain is Fly'em High's loss. Under this type of fact situation, the damages resulting from a gain-oriented measurement
will mirror the damages under a harm-oriented measurement.
Cases within this group would, therefore, remain unchanged by a
methodological shift to a purely gain-oriented measurement
approach.
A similar result is reached in the second case group where
gain is difficult or impossible to gauge. An example would be
185. For the gains multiplication approach applied to four cases of reli-

gious racketeering, see Turley, supra note 3, at 490-96.
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when, after closing the deal, Polecat used the proceeds from the
Fly'em High contract, and a number of other similar flagpole
deals, to secure low interest loans for a major media campaign
before the Fourth of July. The $50,000 received from Fly'em
High, in addition to the $300,000 it received for the other companies, also allows Polecat to satisfy pressing loan payments so that
it can continue to expand in its flagpole operation.
The gains received by Polecat from defrauding Fly'em High
are, in this situation, speculative and uncertain. Even though
some gain beyond the $50,000 is apparent, the true relation between the $50,000 and later profits is probably impossible to
measure accurately. In these cases, the influx of racketeering proceeds from a particular enterprise may only be a fraction of the
total proceeds used in developing later gains, and thus its value in
achieving those gains is highly debatable. The proper measurement in these cases is simply the plaintiff's losses since this figure
can be accepted, at a minimum, as racketeering gains. Although
there are situations where it cannot be assumed that the gains will
equal the harm, it would be the defendant's burden to so show.
In situations like the above, however, the gain-oriented measurement will not be substantially different from the current harmoriented measurement.
A shift to gain-oriented measurement of damages does become important in the last two case groups. In the third case
group, the racketeering gains are greater than the harm inflicted.
This situation would arise if Polecat, having successfully defrauded Fly'em High, takes its $50,000 and uses it to buy a principal share of a defense contracting company whose stock is rapidly
rising. During the three years preceding trial, Polecat's initial investment skyrockets to a value of $200,000, a clear $150,000
profit beyond its racketeering proceeds. Under a harm-oriented
measurement approach, Polecat would pay $50,000, Fly'em
High's losses, plus trebling, or $150,000. This would still result
in a $50,000 profit and make its flagpole venture an efficient
RICO violation. Under the gain-oriented measurement approach, on the other hand, Polecat would pay $200,000, the gains
from its racketeering, plus trebling, or $600,000.
The ability of plaintiffs in the third case group to show a direct relationship between racketeering proceeds and profits derived from those proceeds is critical. Unlike the second case
group where this nexus was missing, cases in this group involve
situations where calculation is possible and the baseline for treb-
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ling can be accurately increased. Moreover, the case within this
group represents those situations where an efficient violation
under RICO is possible. Gain-oriented measurement in these
cases forecloses the possibility of an efficient racketeering violation under RICO.
The final case group contains those cases where the gains are
less than the harm produced by the racketeering. For example,
assume that Fly'em High did not discover the shoddy material until after it had installed hundreds of flagpoles in the Fourth ofJuly
rush. As the first flagpoles jackknife, Fly'em High's business
plummets to almost nothing. Unable to secure loans and confronted with hundreds of lawsuits from patriotic organizations,
Fly'em High folds. In the meantime, Fly'em High's president, left
with a $500,000 business loss and thousands of Dali-like flagpoles, sues Polecat as a racketeering enterprise.
The harm caused by Polecat's fraudulent enterprise is now
$550,000 in comparison to its original $50,000 gain. Accordingly, a harm-oriented measurement, with RICO's trebling multiplier, would transform this $50,000 gain into a penalty of
$1,650,000, as opposed to $150,000 under the gain-oriented
measurement. The obvious problem with this figure is that the
damages are entirely divorced from the gravity of the original
racketeering offense and the degree to which Polecat actually relies upon racketeering proceeds. Just as the third case group is
illustrative of the problem of efficient violations under RICO, this
fourth case group illustrates the danger of perverse incentive.
The trebling of one's business loss is a tantalizing prospect, particularly in the wavering flagpole business. The incentive to willingly succumb to bankruptcy is clearly present. In such a
circumstance, Polecat, benefiting neither from Fly'em High's insolvency nor its $50,000 debt, can well question who is the ultimate racketeer and who is the victim. More importantly,
however, this emphasis will most affect those racketeers with
modest, fractional reliance on racketeering for their proceeds.
Unlike the substantial racketeers in the third case group who benefit from efficient racketeering, these racketeers will often be
pushed into insolvency because their gain is not great enough to
cover the potential indirect repercussions of the victim.
As these four case groups demonstrate, gain-oriented measurement of damages will alter actual awards only in the two case
groups where efficient violations and perverse incentives can
presently skew the method of calculating damages. Moreover in
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the first three case groups, where the ratio of gain to harm is
equal, uncertain or greater, plaintiffs will be guaranteed a damages figure equal to their losses. So long as they can carry their
burden of proving their losses, damages in these areas should
never fall below those attainable under the present system. In the
third case group, moreover, damages are likely to far exceed damages under a harm-oriented measurement.
In the fourth case group, where the gains accrued are less
than the harm inflicted, damages would often be lower than
awards possible under the present harm-oriented measurement.
In these cases, the plaintiff could receive full value for his business losses, but not treble those losses. It would be incumbent
upon the plaintiff to show that a percentage of his losses were in
fact racketeering gains. Otherwise, plaintiffs should not expect
RICO to afford them any relief beyond conventional civil remedies. RICO was not designed to give racketeering victims a windfall remedy but to eliminate racketeering as a profitable
enterprise.18 6 Losses that were of no benefit to the racketeer will
only hamper RICO's effectiveness by making the sanction dependent on the unknown fragility of the victim rather than the reliance of the racketeer. Concentrating on harm instead of gain not
only inhibits the use of RICO to differentiate between racketeers
but, as we will see, negates the most promising use of the trebling
multiplier as a screening method for substantial racketeers.
The use of a gain-oriented measurement of damages would
allow society to detect the reliance of a firm on the proceeds of
each racketeering enterprise. This justification for gain-oriented
damages, it should be noted, is different from Congress' implicit
preference for gain-oriented damages. Congress saw RICO as
penalty maximizing and, at the very least, denying racketeers of
their "ill-gotten gains."' t8 7 Gain-oriented damages satisfy both
purposes by both increasing damages and measuring the gains
rather than the injuries produced by the violation. In this context, however, gain-oriented damages are being offered as one
component in a system that differentiates between substantial and
fractional racketeers. Gain-oriented damages alone will not nec186. ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 94; see also Hearings, supra note 35, at 93738 (statement of P. Budeiri, Staff Att'y, Public Citizen's Congress Watch) ("Since
money is apparently an extremely important possession of those who engage in
financial crime, they will best be deterred by the sure prospect of being fined in
multiples of the amount they hope to steal.").
187. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981).
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essarily indicate the reliance of the firm on racketeering practices
as a whole.
The gain-oriented measurement of damages will supply a reliable figure for a firm engaged in a particular pattern of racketeering. If true reliance is to be gauged beyond the offense
uncovered, society requires an additional method of calibration.
Any such method must have two attributes. First, the method
should be easy to administer. That is, long lists or categories of
various offenses and penalties must be avoided if the objective of
netting a large number of defendants is to be realized. Second,
the method must distinguish between firms based upon what percentage of the firm's business is attributed to racketeering. In
other words, a "Mom and Pop" store guilty of only a small instance of "garden variety fraud" should be allowed to stay solvent
with a stiff sanction, while a large company whose operation depends significantly upon fraud should be eliminated through penalty maximization. A sanction under RICO should ultimately
prove fatal for firms which could withstand the payment of actual
damages but which still rely heavily on tainted funds. Yet any
percentage established statutorily by Congress for such reliance
would be inherently arbitrary and subject to disagreement on a
case-by-case basis. The answer may be found in precisely the
weapon Congress turned to in the final hours of RICO's creation:
the trebling multiplier.
D.

Trebling.- A Litmus Test for Racketeers

As early as 1278 and the Statute of Gloucester, treble damages have been part of our jurisprudence.' 8 8 In economic studies, trebling has been traditionally tied to the concealability factor
of a given crime.' 8 9 Under a cost-benefit analysis, the likelihood
of a crime occurring is a factor of the crime's profitability, the
likelihood of apprehension, and the size of the sanction. 9 0 For
example, normally the penalty for an antitrust violation should
equal its social cost. This is not the case, however, where the violation is concealable since "the prospective violator will discount
... the punishment cost by [the likelihood of apprehension] in
determining the expected punishment cost for the violation."' 9
188. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 741 F.2d 482, 506 (2d Cir. 1984)
(Cardamone, J., dissenting), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
189. See supra note 144.
190. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 221-24
(1976).
191. Id. at 223.
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Thus, a multiplier should increase with the concealability of a violation.19 2 This is certainly germane to racketeering, which by its
very nature, is highly concealable. 1 9 3 Unlike some illegal monopolies or mergers in antitrust, fraud is usually concealed from one
of the parties. Consequently, if a multiplier is properly tied to the
uncertainty and difficulty of prosecution, it is valid, in areas like
fraud, to adopt treble damages "to alter the cost-benefit
94
calculation." 1
While many arguments can be made for applying a multiplier
in the area of civil RICO, the use of the multiplier in the gains
multiplication approach only relates peripherally to its more
traditional purpose. For the purposes of RICO, the real promise
of trebling stems from its capability of "sorting out" firms. Regardless of the concealability of the predicate act, society has an
interest in arranging the demise of firms which are functioning
well below a social norm. 19 5 Trebling offers a crude yet self-effectuating method for detection and differentiation. With trebling,
only those firms with a fractional reliance are likely to survive a
three-fold loss of their racketeering profits. In this way, such artificial distinctions as recidivists and first-time offenders' 96 can be
put aside in favor of a straight reliance test. The intent factor is
not controlling in gains multiplication, though the intent of the
defendant might be demonstrated by the fractional or substantial
reliance of her firm. In this way, society will present equal pressure on all convicted firms so that the determinative factor is
97
reliance. 1
The obvious problem with this method is its imprecision.
The differences in the ability of various firms to adjust to large
unexpected losses is not considered. It is not clear whether this
192. See supra note 144.
193. In a study of fraud against the government, the General Accounting
Office concluded that "[m]ost fraud . . . [goes] undetected . . .. the chances of
being prosecuted and eventually going to jail [for fraud] are slim .... The sad
truth is that crime against the government often does pay." Goldsmith & Keith,

supra note 26, at 83 n. 119 (quoting

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FRAUD IN

How EXTENSIVE IS IT? How CAN IT BE CONTROLLED,
iii (1980)); see also supra note 179 and accompanying text.
194. Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 835 n.37.
195. Cooter, supra note 105.
196. Id. at 1532-33.
197. For this to be the case, however, treble damages would have to be
used more often than they are used currently. The ABA Task Force on civil
RICO reported that it could find only nine cases that resulted in treble damages.
ABA REPORT, supra note 8, at 58 ("The Task Force is aware of very few Civil
RICO cases that have gone to judgment .... ").
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS:
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potential for error is great enough to merit the rejection of this
alternative method of measurement. Yet, gains multiplication
does promise many of the characteristics discussed earlier as necessary for an effective racketeering deterrent. For example, the
gains multiplication approach allows the rough numbers of defendants to remain high, bringing the sanction to bear on a wide
variety of racketeers. Likewise, under gains multiplication, the
community standard of malum in se is still given meaning through
the eradication of substantial racketeers. Trebling profits would
be retained to permit a large enough prize to discourage settling
of suits. Finally, the sanction would be high enough to avoid the
problem of elasticity of conduct which arises when penalties are
tied too closely to actual costs.
Penalty maximization is still part of the damages formula
under the gains multiplication approach but it is now focused on
the key element of reliance. RICO would still strive to ruin certain racketeers by increasing damages to a point where substantial
racketeers would be forced out of business. The driving purpose
of the RICO damages, however, would no longer be to blindly
penalty maximize. The purpose of the multiplier, therefore,
would be seriously undercut by the trebling of costs unrelated to
a firm's actual reliance on racketeering profits.
The more pressing problem, however, may arise before trial
in the form of a perverse incentive similar to the one considered
earlier.' 9 8 If a plaintiff can expect to receive the racketeer's trebled profits in addition to the usual actual damages, there is every
incentive to stand in silent collusion as the racketeering continues.' 9 9 This is a variation on the perverse incentive encountered
earlier in applying the Clayton Act remedies. There, the plaintiff
prolonged the racketeering association in order to increase his
own damages. Here, the plaintiff would not be suing for his lost
profits, but for the profits gained by the racketeer. Nevertheless,
the incentive remains the same: to assist the racketeer through
calculating acquiescence. Once again, the distinction between
who is the racketeer and who is the victim could become difficult
to discern in such a case. Yet differences exist. Unlike the earlier
perverse incentive problem, a RICO plaintiff cannot act predatorily and expect a comparable return under the gains multiplication approach. For example, catastrophic losses, like those
198. For a discussion of the perverse incentive, see supra notes 145-49 and
accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
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considered in the third case group, would not be subject to trebling. Moreover, the calculating plaintiff would run into practical
difficulties under the gains multiplication approach. Instead of
counting on trebled losses, a plaintiff under this approach could
only estimate racketeer gains. While this would likely guarantee a
plaintiff a base figure equal to losses, as in case group one, it
would make windfalls, as in case group four, difficult to predict.
The likely result is probably a small decrease in the level of perverse incentives under the Act while reaping the other systemic
benefits of gains multiplication.
CONCLUSION

RICO and the Clayton Act appear destined to battle for total
dominion over the proper use of treble damages in civil cases.
Like Remus and Romulus, both acts share a common ancestry
and many common traits. Both are designed to bring about
marketwide changes through litigation. Both employ the novel
use of "private attorneys general" and both contain an array of
procedural and substantive incentives to sustain a "second front."
Most importantly, both allow for treble damage awards. Given
these similarities, and Congress' open borrowing of Clayton Act
provisions in creating RICO, it is natural that critics of RICO
should continually try to amend the Act by reference to antitrust
penalties.
This Article attempts to show why there is a limit to the analogies that can be drawn between RICO and the Clayton Act.
That limit is reached in the measurement of damages. The treble
damages provisions of the two acts rest on fundamentally conflicting economic and normative realities in their respective areas.
The Clayton Act's cost minimization approach is geared towards
pricing antitrust violations so as to encourage efficient violations
while deterring violations that cost society more than they benefit
the violator. Conversely, civil RICO works to penalty maximize
through a system of sanctions so as to deter all racketeering violations-violations considered by society to be malum in se.
The gains multiplication approach is offered as a working example of a new method for calculating damages under civil RICO
that incorporates RICO's penalty-maximizing philosophy of damages. This approach would retain penalty maximization while
concentrating on the racketeer's gains, rather the victim's losses,
in measuring damages. In so doing, it is argued, RICO's penaltymaximizing functions will focus on racketeering reliance and ac-
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quire a needed ability to more accurately differentiate between
types of racketeering firms.
The gains multiplication approach is not a panacea for all of
RICO's ills but it is an example of how the Act can be changed
without significantly changing the Act's original purpose. While
this new approach has much to recommend it, it is of secondary
importance to the general point that it is meant to illustrate. Future efforts at modifying civil RICO's penalty provisions that rely
on antitrust analogies must consider the fundamentally divergent
purposes of damages under the two acts. Congress and the
courts must come to accept that, as with the legendary twin brothers of pre-Rome, irreconcilable differences between the two acts
linger below the surface and these differences cannot be resolved
within the same statutory framework without the practical elimination of one scheme in favor of the other.
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